Introduction
Thepurposeofthissubmissionistodescribeseveralwaysinwhichintellectualproperty rights can affect the right to participate in cultural life. In its General Comment No. 17, the Committee emphasized that states are obligated to seek an appropriate balance between measures to protect authors' moral and material interests, which may include thegrantofexclusiverights,andrights such astherighttotakepartinculturallife.
3 A new General Comment interpreting Article 15(1)(a) of the Covenant provides a valuable opportunitytoarticulatemeasuresstatesmayimplementtoachievethisbalance.
1 Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. The author wishes to acknowledge the excellent researchandtranslationcontributionsofStephanieFigueroa,JillianHowell,andNicoleKennedy. 2 ThisabstractwasaddedaftersubmissiontotheCommittee. 3 GeneralCommentNo.17,Therightofeveryonetobenefitfromtheprotectionofthemoralandmaterial interestsresultingfromanyscientific,literaryorartisticproductionofwhichheorsheistheauthor(article 15,paragraph1(c),oftheCovenant),U.N.Doc.E/C.12/GC/17,12January2006, ¶39(e). This submission does not seek to reiterate arguments raised in connection with the drafting of General Comment No. 17. Instead, its goal is to describe, based on wellestablishedprinciplesarticulatedbytheCommitteeinitsjurisprudence,severalways in which states may need to limit domestic intellectual property rights in order to adequately protect the right to participate in cultural life. This is an issue that the CommitteehasidentifiedasaconcerninitsGeneralCommentNo.17andonetowhichit isuniquelypositionedtorespond.
I.ParticipatoryandProtectiveDimensions Domesticintellectualpropertyrightscanaffectboththeabilitytoparticipateincultural life as well as the very essence of people's culture. As Yvonne Donders has argued, the meaning of cultural life "now represents, in accordance with the anthropological approach, a way of life of individuals and communities."
4 Individuals require access to culturalgoodsinordertobeabletoparticipateinandcreatemeaninginconnectionwith these ways of life. In this sense, the ability "take part" in cultural life requires that individualsbeabletoconsume,transform,andshareculture. At the same time, however, individuals and communities also need control over and protectionoftheirculturalgoodsfromaccessbyothersinordertopreservetheirwayof life. The right to "take part" in cultural life thus also requires that individuals and communitieshavetheabilitytosettheconditionsunderwhichculturalgoodsassociated withtheirwaysoflifeareconsumed,transformed,andshared. The participatory dimension of the right to take part in cultural life also requires the ability to share and transform culture. Individuals "take part" in cultural life as both consumersandcreatorsofculture.Becauseculturallifeisaproductofinteractionswithin a community, the right to participate in cultural life necessarily includes being able to shareculturalgoodswithothers.
8 Transformativeuseisalsocentraltothisright.Culture does not exist in a vacuum but rather develops and evolves as it is shared and transformed, and creating cultural works often involves building on and transforming existing cultural material. Sharing and transformation are thus integral parts of what it meansto"takepart"inculturallifeandarenecessarytomeaningfullyrealizethisright. Finally,limitationsonaccesstocultural goodsalsohavesignificantimplicationsforthe abilitytoparticipateintheculturallifeofone'schoosing.Intellectualpropertylawscan impair the overall quantity and diversity of the cultural goods in the public domain. Diversityofculturalgoodshelpstoensurethatindividualsareabletochoosethecultural life in which they participate.
9 Incremental restrictions on cultural goods thus limit the absolute amount of materials available to individuals as well as their ability to choose whichmaterialstoaccess.
III.LimitsonParticipation Thereareseveralwaysinwhichintellectualpropertylawscanlimittherighttotakepart in cultural life. First, exclusive rights can limit access to cultural goods. Cultural goods undercopyrightmightbeunavailableifthecopyrightownersdecidenottodisseminate particularworks.Copyrightcanalsocontributetoalackoftranslationsofworksinless widely-spoken languages, if copyright owners do not create such translations or allow democratizationrepresentedbytheanthropologicalunderstandingofculturallifeisthusaccompaniedbya correspondingincreaseinthequantityanddiversityofwhatwemightunderstandasculturalgoods. 7 Those aspects of a right that are necessary for the right to be meaningfully realized must be protected togetherwiththerightitself.SeeGeneralCommentNo.14,Therighttothehighestattainablestandardof health, U.N.Doc.E/C.12/2000/4,11August2000, ¶11. Accesstothe Internet might beanother underlying determinantoftherighttoparticipateinculturallife. 8 Therighttoparticipateinculturallifehas"collectivedimensions"evenifitisunderstoodasanindividual right.SeeDonders,supranote4,p.5. 9 See,e.g.,id.p.4(notingthattheCommittee'sRevisedGuidelinesforeseearoleforculturalcommunities otherthanthenationalcommunity);JulieRingelheim,IntegratingCulturalConcernsintheInterpretation of General Individual Rights -Lessons from the International Human Rights Case Law, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/40/4,9May2008,pp.6-7(discussingtheimportanceofculturaldiversity). them to be created by others.
10
Works may also be geographically inaccessible if publishersorauthorsdecidenottoallowtheirdistributioninparticularcountries. Further, access might be limited if authors take advantage of exclusive rights to charge prices that make the works unaffordable and thus effectively unavailable. For example, copyrightallowspublisherstochargepricesfortextbooksthatmaybedifficultformany consumerstopay.
11
Accesstoeducationalmaterialssuchastextbooksaffectsnotonlyan individual's right to education, but also his or her ability to meaningfully take part in culturallife. Access can also become prohibitively expensive if users are required to obtain multiple licenses in order to use a particular work.
12
One commentator noted, for example, that the difficulty of navigating multiple sets of ownership rights and the threat of litigation was likely to discourage houses of worship in the United States from using copyrighted materials during services.
13
The author explained that most houses of worship cannot afford the high cost of negotiating license fees or defending against copyright litigation and were likely to be deterred from using the artistic expressions of popular culturemusic,sketches,dramaticscenes,andvideos-thathavebecomeanimportantelementof contemporaryworshipservices. Increases in intellectual property rights may be accompanied by decreases in the protectionsaffordedtherighttoparticipateinculturallife,asfewerculturalgoodsenter the public domain or goods become less accessible. As a result, states contemplating measures to strengthen intellectual property rights in ways that restrict individuals' ability to take part in cultural life should give such measures the most careful consideration and justify them by reference to their existing obligations under the Covenant. For example, states contemplating the extension of copyright terms under domestic law would be required to demonstrate either that the extension will not unreasonably burden the right to take part in cultural life or that such burden is warrantedinordertoprotectotherrightsundertheCovenant.
Conclusion
The Committee has already emphasized the importance of protecting the underlying determinants of rights and strictly justifying retrogressive measures. In the context of intellectualproperty,theseprinciplesmeanthatstatesmayberequiredtotakestepsto protect access to cultural goods and the ability to engage in transformative use, and to proceed carefully where domestic legal reforms would limit these capacities. Applying these principles to intellectual property would provide additional guidance to states aboutwhatisrequiredtoprotecttherighttotakepartinculturallifeinthecontextof intellectualpropertyandtobalancetheobligationsenshrinedinArticle15(1)(a)and(c)of theCovenant.
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GeneralCommentNo.3, The natureof States parties obligations(Art.2,par.1), U.N.Doc.E/1991/23,14 December1990, ¶9.
